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Mary Douglas is generally regarded as a faithful disciple of Durkheim. Yet her classic 
work Purity and Danger is best understood as premised upon a fundamental 
disagreement with Durkheim, who she accused of conflating purity with Ǯthe sacredǯ and impurity with Ǯthe profaneǯ. Key to this disagreement was the theoretical status of the Ǯbusy scrubbingsǯ of everyday housework. This disagreement has had a substantial 
legacy since, in turning her attention to purity and impurity in their specificity, Douglas 
bequeathed anthropology and sociology a theory of purity and impurity that has 
remained an important, perhaps even dominant, paradigm. This paradigm has been 
identified as an exemplar of synchronic analysis. Yet this paradigm itself is the product 
of a specific historical and intellectual context, little recognised today. Attending to this 
context holds opens possibilities, which have otherwise tended to be neglected, for 
theorising purity and impurity in their specificity. 
 




Mary Douglas is rightfully taken to be in many ways Ǯfaithful discipleǯ of Durkheim 
(Fardon 1987), and has described herself as such: ǮAs she expressed it in a radio interviewǯ, Douglas perceived that her Ǯproblem has been to work with Durkheim's 
vision and to apply the most suggestive parts of his work towards a completion of his 
projectǯ ȋFardon ͳͻͺ͹: ͷȌ. Yet this article will explore a foundational disagreement with 
Durkheim, which has been little noted by commentators who thereby misunderstand the premise of Douglasǯ work Purity and Danger. As OǯBrien ȋʹͲͲ͸: ͻȌ has noted, the text is known for its Ǯfamous dictum that dirt is ǲmatter out of placeǳ. Whilst this dictum is 
repeated ad nauseam... its underlying theoretical and analytical context is invariably ignoredǯ. Without awareness of this context, the decisive criticism of Durkheim staged 
by Douglas has been missed. Douglasǯ proposal that impurity attends breaches in 
cherished classifications has often been characterised as an exemplar of synchronic 
anthropological theory (e.g. Maranda 1972); it is important to recognise, however, that this Ǯexemplarǯ has its own history – attention to which can deepen and potentially alter 
its meaning.  
For, though it has been recognised by a few commentators on her work (e.g. 
Isenberg and Owen 1977), Douglas (1997) has expressed disappointment that the field 
has not generally recognised the stakes in her discovery of secular defilement, and 
attended to purity/impurity in their specific logic and social operation beyond their 
reduction to aspects of Ǯsacrednessǯ. Without attention to the inadequacy of Robertson Smithǯs account of sacred phenomena, to which Durkheim, Franz Steiner and her own work were responding, she warned that scholars seriously risk missing Ǯthe substance of what was going on in anthropologyǯ in the period in which her account of purity and 
impurity germinated (Douglas 1999a: 8).  Douglas was right to worry. As Riley (2005) 
and Lynch (2012) have observed, there remains today a tendency within, especially 
Anglophone, Durkheimian thought to neglect secular defilement – and to a lesser extent 
impurity generally (despite the influence of Bataille and Hertz in some quarters). There 
even remains a tendency to read Douglasǯ own work through this limited lens ȋe.g. 
Alexander 2006: 576).  The article will begin by exploring the roots of Douglasǯs 
research questions in a debate between Robertson Smith and Durkheim. Whereas 
Robertson Smith had situated beliefs in ritual pollution as a mark of irrationality, 
Durkheim elevated impurity to equal theoretical status with impurity in his idea of the Ǯambiguity of the sacredǯ. Douglas argued against both theoristsǯ conclusions, whilst utilising a Durkheimian method. She highlighted the significance of Ǯsecular defilementǯ, 
missed by Durkheim in his subsumption of impurity into a face of the sacred. As such, her famous statement that Ǯdirt is matter out of placeǯ was not intended as the 
synchronic, totalising theory readers have often presumed. In fact, read in context this 
phrase is better understood as a provocation to the development of new reflections on 
purity and impurity in their specificity across domains of discourse and practice. 
 
 
Impurity and anti-Semitism 
 ǲNow to confront our opening question. Can there be any  people who confound sacredness with uncleanness?ǳ  
Douglas, Purity and Danger ([1966] 2002: 196). 
 Douglasǯ arguments about purity and impurity in Purity and Danger can be seen as a 
move in a game to which we have forgotten the rules; these arguments are still 
intelligible, but do not yield their full meaning. Among commentators, Klawans (2011: 
108) is among the few to have recognised the significance of this opening question, which indicates that ǮDouglasǯs arguments in Purity and Danger were addressed against 
a very specific target: the long history of Protestant antiritualism', as evidenced especially ȋbut not exclusivelyȌ in… William Robertson Smithǯ. The first step in 
reclaiming this meaning is to identify more precisely the debate to which Purity and 
Danger began as an intervention. As Douglas ([1966] 2002: 196) explained in concluding the book, its Ǯopening questionǯ was: ǮCan there be any people who confound sacredness with uncleanness?ǳ. This question relates to a debate between Durkheim 
and Robertson Smith, encapsulated within the famous page of The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life in which Durkheim announces his theory of the Ǯambiguity of the sacredǯ. 
This page explicitly cites and stands generally in a vital intertextual relationship to a 
section – pages 152-3 – of Reverend Robertson Smithǯs ȋ1894) Lectures on the Religion 
of the Semites. The intertextuality of Durkheimǯs discussion of the Ǯambiguity of the sacredǯ was well recognised by contemporaries of Durkheim, such as Van Gennep 
(1909: 12), but with the exception of Ruel (1998) has been missed by subsequent 
scholars who have treated the concept as originating with Durkheim and Mauss. In fact, 
in the first mention of the phrase by the Durkheimian school, Mauss and Hubert ([1889] 
1964: 200Ȍ wrote of Biblical sacrifices in which Ǯthe extreme sanctity of the victim finished up becoming impurityǯ. They explained this occurrence with reference to Ǯthe 
ambiguous character of sacred things, which Robertson Smith so admirably pointed outǯ.  
The passages from Robertson Smith and from Durkheim will be cited at length to 
make the intertextual conversation visible. In Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, 
Robertson Smith (1894: 152-3) had argued:  
  
There is no part of life in which the savage does not feel himself to be 
surrounded by mysterious agencies and recognise the need of walking 
warily. Moreover all taboos do not belong to religion proper...  but rather 
appear in many cases to be precautions against contact with evil spirits, and 
the like. Thus alongside of taboos that exactly correspond to rules of 
holiness, protecting the inviolability of idols and sanctuaries, priests and 
chiefs, and generally of all persons and things pertaining to the gods and 
their worship, we find another kind of taboo which in the Semitic field has its 
parallel in rules of uncleanness. Women after child-birth, men who have 
touched a dead body and so forth, are temporarily taboo and separated from 
human society, just as the same persons are unclean in Semitic religion... In 
most savage societies no sharp line seems to be drawn between the two 
kinds of taboo just indicated, and even in more advanced nations the notions 
of holiness and uncleanness often touch. Among the Syrians for example swineǯs flesh was taboo, but it was an open question whether this was 
because the animal was holy or because it was unclean...  On the other hand 
the fact that the Semites or at least the northern Semites distinguish between 
the holy and the unclean, marks a real advance above savagery. All taboos 
are inspired by awe of the supernatural, but there is a great moral difference 
between precautions against the invasion of mysterious hostile powers and 
precautions founded on respect for the prerogative of a friendly god. The 
former belong to magical superstition – the barrenest of all aberrations, 
which, being founded only on fear, acts merely as a bar to progress... The 
irrationality of laws of uncleanness, from the standpoint of spiritual religion 
or even of the higher heathenism, is so manifest that they must necessarily 
be looked on as having survived from an earlier form of faith and of society.  
 
Like many other early anthropologists (see Eilberg-Schwartz 1990; Jahoda 2009), 
Robertson Smith makes a comparison between the Semites – in which he tacitly 
includes both Biblical Hebrews and contemporary Jews – and savages. The former are 
better than the latter, but still far down the spectrum compared with Ǯthe standpoint of spiritual religionǯ, Protestant Christianity for Robertson Smith (van Oord 2008). What 
savages and Semites have in common is their beliefs about ritual uncleanliness. By 
contrast, Robertson Smithǯs Ǯspiritual religionǯ regards divinity as rightfully pure, a 
perspective which results in a love of God and the capacity for rational progress (see 
Warburg 1989). By contrast, Robertson Smith suggests, both Semites and savages have Ǯirrationalǯ laws of taboo and uncleanness, rather than recognising in line with 
Protestant Christianity and reason that the truly sacred is always pure. The 
commonalities and differences become stark when this passage from Robertson Smith 
is compared to the famous page of Durkheim ([1912] 2001: 304-6) on purity and impurity as the two faces of Ǯthe sacredǯ: 
 
Religious forces are of two kinds. Some are benevolent, guardians of physical 
and moral order, dispensers of life, health, all the qualities that men value…On the other hand, there are negative and impure powers that 
produce disorder, cause death and illness, and instigate sacrilege… But even 
as these two aspects of religious life oppose each other, they are closely 
related. First of all, the both sustain the same relationship with profane 
things, who must abstain from any relationship with holy things. The impure 
are no less forbidden than the pure, and they, too, are taken out of 
circulation, meaning that they are also sacred. To be sure, the two do not 
evoke the same feelings. Disgust and horror are one thing and respect 
another. Nonetheless... the nuances of difference between these two 
attitudes are sometimes so elusive that it is not always easy to determine the 
state of mind of the faithful. Among certain Semitic peoples, pork was 
forbidden, but it was not always certain if it was forbidden as an impure 
thing or as something holy... the pure and impure are not two separate 
genera but two varieties of the same genus which includes all sacred things. 
There are two kinds of sacred things, one auspicious, the other inauspicious. 
And not only is there no discontinuity between these the two forms, but the 
same object can pass from one to the other without changing its nature. Pure 
can be made impure, and vice versa. The possibility of these transmutations 
accounts for the ambiguity of the sacred. 
 Durkheim first read Robertson Smithǯs text in ͳͺͻͷ, the very period of the Dreyfus affair 
which led Durkheim to help found the Dreyfusard Ligue pour la Défense des Droits de lǯ(omme to contest anti-Semitism in the French State and in society in the name of 
universal values (Fournier 2007). This political context can perhaps help sharpen our 
sense of Durkheimǯs work in this passage: he was living a context in which powerful discourses made out that ǮJews are a manifestation of the impure; they are ǲevil and 
impure powers, bringers of disorder, causes of death and sickness, instigators of 
sacrilegeǳǯ ȋGoldberg ʹͲͲͺ: ͵ͲͶȌ. )n Elementary Forms, Durkheim accepts the architecture of Robertson Smithǯs theory and some of its narrative, even as he uses 
universalism to denature its anti-Semitism and eschews the culturally-specific term Ǯtabooǯ. He agrees with Robertson Smith that the texts of the Hebrew Bible and 
contemporary ethnographic observations observe uncleanness as well as purity as 
dimensions of religious phenomena. Yet he does not denigrate this as a deviation from 
the true perspective of Protestant Christianity, in which the sacred is always pure. 
Instead, he generalises it, universalising Ǯthe sacredǯ as a transhistorical quality that 
organises any religion, indeed any society. The case of the northern Semites, perplexed 
by whether they revere pork as holy or unclean, is subverted by Durkheim. Instead of 
indicating that savages can confuse the two, he sees in this a deeper insight: that purity 
and impurity are two varieties of the same genus, sacredness. In including impurity as 
one of the two aspects of the sacred, he places Semitic and Ǯprimitive religionsǯ within 
the same sphere and level as Robertson Smithǯs Protestant Ǯspiritual religionǯ.  
Yet the account of the Ǯambiguity of the sacredǯ was not prised or purchased from Robertson Smithǯs text without retaining some remainder. For in practice, the notion of Ǯthe sacredǯ taken by Durkheim from Robertson Smithǯs account retained the latterǯs 
asymmetrical privileging of the pure as the primary nature of the sacred, and the 
impure as primarily associated with the profane. The primary role played by the sacred 
in his sociology, expressing and socially supporting society, tends to align it with the 
pure as the symbol of order and wholeness (cf. [1900a] 1992: 159). In his first 
description of the impure as an aspect of the sacred, Durkheim defines it in part through its capacity to Ǯunleash every profanation of sacred thingsǯ, implying that the sacred is 
conceptualised as associated with the pure ([1894 2002: 304). More generally, when 
discussing the sacred, he tends to assign it the tacit property of purity, for example: ǮThat an impure person may not approach sacred waters is a general principle – whether the impurity is moral or physical is not a distinction made by ancient religionǯ 
([1894] 2002: 179).  
On a few occasions, Durkheim notes this tendency in his work to align the sacred 
with the pure and the profane with the impure emerging in his narration of the 
relationship between the sacred and society, and re-asserts the duality of purity and 
impurity as equal aspects (e.g. [1906] 1953: 36; [1912] 2001: 315-6). Yet the sacred 
must almost always be pure since, for Durkheim, it ultimately sustains society. As a result, he offers no more than Ǯfleeting commentsǯ ȋShilling & Mellor 2010: 441) on 
impurity. As Durkheim explains, justifying this neglect: ǮEverything is found in religion, 
and if it  often represents triumph of good over evil, life over death, the powers of light 
over the powers of darkness, this is because reality is no different. If the relation 
between these opposite forces were reversed, life would be impossible; whereas in fact 
it sustains itselfǯ ȋ[ͳͻͳʹ] ʹͲͲͳ: ͵ͳ͸Ȍ.  Arguing against Kant, for whom the notion of Ǯsubstanceǯ was an a priori category 
of any human experience, Durkheim ([1898] 1974) had forbidden sociology from using 
the term Ǯsubstanceǯ in his early writings. He believed that such concepts risked reifying 
phenomena rather than seeking their social conditions of possibility and the range of 
their social effects (cf. Stedman-Jones 2001: 168, 367). Yet The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life ([1912] 2001: 41, 110, 250) at points expressly theorises Ǯthe sacredǯ as a Ǯsubstanceǯ or Ǯessenceǯ, universally applicable across human life, possessing an inherent 
ambiguity between purity and impurity in its role as symbol variously for societal order 
or chaos. As Pickering (1990: 92) explains, such an account implies that Ǯthe sacred is 
kind of lump which whilst it might change its texture and spread itself in different ways 
in different societies it is always present and is perpetually maintainedǯ. Durkheimǯs 
collaborator and nephew Mauss admitted, in an unpublished manuscript, that 
Durkheimǯs reification of Ǯthe sacredǯ and his conflation of the sacred with the pure 
worried both him and his colleague Hubert, though they did not want to raise this 
concern publically (see Martelli 1995; Pickering 2012). Mauss ([1930] 1998: 40) noted 
that rather than addressing the impure sacred, in the form of magic, in its specificity, ǮDurkheim tried to deduce it sociologically from the notion of the sacred. We were never sure that he was rightǯ.  
Mauss suggests that Durkheimǯs focus on social stability meant that the Durkheimian Ǯsacredǯ tended to be conceptualised as pure as a symbol of the social 
order, and in line with the Christian alignment of sacredness and purity. It is therefore 
addressed – tacitly and, Mauss suggests, in an insufficiently reflective way – as if it were 
always pure. Mauss argues that this conceptual problem led to a neglect of impure forms of sacredness in Durkheimǯs thought, and to a tendency to further conflate the 
impure and the profane. For instance, in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, it can be observed that Durkheim situates ǮSatanǯ as Ǯimpureǯ but the Ǯblack massǯ as Ǯprofaneǯ 
ȋ[ͳͻͳʹ] ʹͲͲͳ: Ͷʹ, ͵ͳ͸Ȍ. )n ǮTwo Laws of Penal Evolutionǯ ȋ[ͳͻͲͲb] ͳͻ͹ͺ: ͳ͹͵Ȍ, Durkheim writes: Ǯthe duties which it prescribes for us create obligations towards a 
personality which infinitely surpasses our own; this is the collective personality which 
we imagine in its abstract purity or, as most often happens, with the help of truly religious symbolsǯ.  
Indeed, Bataille, too, would diagnose a tendency to submerge purity and impurity within Ǯthe sacredǯ in Durkheimian thought (see Riley 2010; Falasca-Zamponi 
2011). He suggests that prior social theorising had conceded too much to Protestant 
bias in tending to align the sacred with the pure and the profane with the impure: 
 
Christianity could not get rid of impurity altogether, it could not wipe out 
uncleanness entirely. But it defined the boundaries of the sacred world after 
its own fashion. In this fresh definition impurity, uncleanness and guilt were 
driven outside the pale. Impure sacredness was thenceforward the business 
of the profane world (Bataille [1957] 2007: 121) 
 
In the mix of Enlightenment discourse and Protestant Christianity which characterised 
thinkers such as Robertson Smith, Ǯthe rational idea is strongly linked to the celestial transcendence of the sacred, matter to diabolic impurityǯ ȋBataille [1947] 1998: 40). 
This supports the alignment of the sacred with the pure. Bataille highlights the significance of Robertson Smith, whose work represents Ǯno doubt the oldest… division of the sacred world into two opposing partsǯ; Bataille criticises Durkheim for the treatment of Ǯthe internal duality of the sacredǯ in Ǯhis theory, which is limited to a recapitulation of Smithǯs dataǯ. Bataille concludes, pessimistically from the point of 
theory, that Ǯthe slippage from the impure sacred to the profane ȋassociated with 
matter) cannot be avoidedǯ ȋ[ͳͻ47] 1998: 41). Though he documents that this shift 
occurred within history and specifically the history of Christianity and of Western 
Reason, Bataille ([1973] 1989: 69) nonetheless treats as somewhat inevitable that within Ǯa dominant movement of reflective thought, the divine appears linked to purity, 
the profane to impurityǯ. Though revised, the Durkheimian model of the Ǯambiguity of the sacredǯ retains its privilege for Bataille as the paradigm for thinking purity and 
impurity (see also Caillois [1950] 1959). This position differs from that of Douglas, as 
we shall now see.  
 Secular defilement 
 
Looking back in the preface to the 2002 edition of Purity and Danger ([1966] 2002), 
Douglas explains part of her interest in purity and impurity as the result of her 
ethnographic fieldwork in the early 1950s with the Lele of Congo. The Lele moral and 
symbolic universe is described in the early publications as organised by a series of 
aligned binary oppositions, shared as a set of tacit assumptions throughout all the members of the bounded society: Ǯthey make analogies between the relations of male to 
female, man to animal, forest to grassland, and through these analogies a further relation between man and Godǯ ȋ[ͳͻͷͷ] ͳͻ͹ͷ: ʹͳȌ. Underpinning these different 
analogies Douglas perceived the fundamental division between animals and humans, a 
boundary enacted through human expressions of shame and disgust at things that are 
seen as dirty. Those on the margins of normal society, the magic-wielding sorcerer and 
the chief, are presumed to have an inverse relationship with this symbolic system, 
garnering magical power through acts such as concocting charms using excreta in the 
case of the former, or committing ritual incest in the case of the latter. Douglas also 
noted that the Lele avoid eating anomalous animals, such as those that move between 
aquatic and land environments. The exception to the rule is the pangolin, a scaly 
anteater. The pangolin looks like a fish to the Lele, but lives on land, and is selected as a 
special object of ritual veneration. In the course of her fieldwork, Douglasǯ fieldnotes report that her Lele informants directly Ǯasked [her] to define dirt in England – Not earth, just simply [dirt]. Contrast: idea of dirt, with ǲgood clean mudǳ, etc. Chesterfield ǲDirt is any matter displacedǳ, e.g. hair, crowning glory etc. and hair in the soup. But child putting spoon it has licked back in the veg. tureen and told off for being ǲdirtyǳ. ǲDirtyǳ is much wider ranger than just ǲdirtǳǯ ȋͳͻͷ͵, )): ʹͻȌ. 
In the 2002 preface Douglas also emphasises that her interest in the topic of 
purity and impurity as facilitated by her interaction with her teacher-colleagues at Oxford, Mysore Srinivas and Franz Steiner. Srinivasǯs ȋͳͻͷʹȌ Religion and Society Among 
the Coorgs describes the position of the Coorgs within the caste system. They enacted a 
tight control over the symbolic boundaries of the body, a strategy which aimed to 
maintain and advance their position in the social hierarchy by appropriating the 
symbolic indicators of high status, a process famously termed by Srinivas 
ǮSanskritisationǯ ȋͳͻͷʹ: ͵Ͳ-3). The text is used in Purity and Danger ([1966] 2002: 152-
3) to clinch the argument that the social boundaries of the group as a whole are 
reflected in the purity classifications used to relate to the integrity of the body. Steinerǯs 
(1956) Taboo set itself against the influence of theorists such as Robertson Smith, who 
had depicted taboos on impure phenomena as a secondary and problematic deviation 
from the original and true form of the sacred as a pure image of divinity. He depicts, therefore, Ǯthe problem of taboo as a Victorian inventionǯ, and, specifically, as a ǮProtestant discoveryǯ ȋͳͻͷ͸: ͷͲȌ. (e suggests that Ǯit is a misunderstanding to apply Durkheimǯs notion of the sacred and profaneǯ as a sufficient account of classifications of 
purity and impurity (1956: 41). Rather, he draw upon Lévy-Bruhl to argue for Ǯtaboo concepts as instrumental in classifying and identifying kinds of transgressionǯ, and in Ǯthe institutional localisation of dangerǯ ȋͳͻͷ͸: ͳͳʹ, ͳͶ͹Ȍ. His conclusion was, therefore, 
rules of defilement play a role in organising the communal response to phenomena that 
are either 1) seen as transgressive or 2) as dangerous to society as a whole. These ideas generated not only Douglasǯ title, but also her account in Purity and Danger of the use of 
purity classifications to support the overall cognitive system of a society and to sanction 
those in marginal or ambiguous social positions (see [1966] 2002: 117-127; Douglas 
[1968] 1975: 53). Douglas (1999a: 6) later stated that ǮPurity and Danger was conceived and planned according to his teachingǯ.  Yet another aspect of Douglasǯs debt to Srinivas and Steiner was that, as well as 
taking as their academic object the way ritual defilement could serve as a symbolic 
system used to regulate social life, Ǯeach, as Brahmin and Jew, tried in their daily lives to handle problems of ritual cleannessǯ ȋ[1966] 2002: xii). Douglas (1999a:4) attributes 
her first academic interest in the issue of ritual classifications of pure and impure to the weekly Friday Social Anthropology department trips to the Kingǯs Arms pub in the late 
1940s: both Srinivas and Steiner would refrain from the communal consumption of ham 
sandwiches – as would Douglas who, as an observant Catholic, did not eat meat on a 
Friday. This personal engagement with scholars who both lived by and studied issues of ritual purity appears to have been an important spur for Douglasǯ own reflexive 
encounter with the issue, and for her later attempt to theorise the topic in comparative 
perspective. In an interview with Alan MacFarlane (2006), Douglas retrospectively 
noted that her framework for discussing purity drew powerfully from the Catholicism of 
her upbringing, and was stimulated by the saliency of the issue of the significance and 
value of ritual in contemporary debates within Anglo-Catholicism (a link drawn at the 
time by Leach 1971: 45).  
The encounter with Srinivas and Steiner, together with her own Catholicism and 
fieldwork observations, can be seen as having primed Douglas ([1966] 2002: 9)  to start 
Purity and Danger by contesting the view, Ǯvery widely heldǯ by modern Western scholars, that Ǯholiness and impurity are at opposite polesǯ in religious systems. In an 
article for New Society written just prior to work on Purity and Danger, Douglas 
suggested that Ǯit was partly a matter of words and definitions. )f in European languages 
the idea of the holy or the sacred was taken as essential defilable and not defiling, how 
could the same term be applied to an exotic concept which partly contradicted its meaning? (ow can a thing be holy and unclean at the same time?ǯ emerges as a question 
and problem within a framework within which the sacred is presumed to always be 
pure (Douglas [1964] 2013: 138). The assumptions underpinning this question, 
however, are not only culturally contingent but moralising: Ǯ)n short, Durkheim took 
over two skewed concepts from Robertson Smith and added a third. First, he took over 
the idea of savage irrationality, so that certain elements of behaviour [such as ritual in 
modern society] were left unanalysable. Second, he took over the ethical view of 
religion [which implied that the sacred as the symbol of society would ultimately be 
pure], with its unanalysable primitive residue. His own contribution to the boulder-
strewn path was to leave us with the idea of ǲthe Sacredǳ, a substantive reifiedǯ ([1964] 
2013: 140). As a result, she describes Durkheimǯs account of sacredness and 
contamination as Ǯquite wrongǯ, verging on Ǯdeludedǯ ȋ[ͳͻ͸Ͷ] ʹͲͳ͵: ͳͶͳ: see also 
Douglas [1968] 1975). 
Chapter 1 of Purity and Danger positions her task as no less than to do some 
housekeeping of Durkheimian theory, purifying it thoroughly of its roots in Robertson 
Smith. She urges that an adequate account of purity and impurity cannot be developed Ǯwithout first rubbing the slate clean of... preconceptions which derive... from Robertson Smithǯ ([1966] 2002: 27), whose thought she later described as a key part of a set of 
anthropological assumptions animated by a Ǯmuddled mixture of scientism, 
sanctimonious theology, and nineteenth-century complacencyǯ ȋͳͻͻͻa: 7). Whether 
directly derived from Robertson Smith or from this more general set of assumptions, in 
Purity and Danger Douglas observes that it is widely Ǯsupposed to be a mark of primitive religion to make no clear distinction between sanctity and uncleannessǯ (ibid.). She 
contends that this assumption results in a circular logic. A Ǯprimitive religionǯ becomes 
defined as one that treats Ǯthe sacredǯ as capable of impure form. At the same time, the 
fact that it is only Ǯprimitive religionsǯ which contradict anthropological/Protestant 
dogma is used to dismiss further investigation of the particular social operation of 
purity and impurity classifications. Looking back, Douglas (1999a: 12) remarks that the problem was that Ǯthey disapproved of beliefs in defilement as unacceptably primitive, 
while they approved of the transmission of sacred power through blessings, while never troubling to work out why one was ǲthe lowest form of superstitionǳ, and the other was modern and a goodǯ.  
When societies were observed which assigned religious significance to 
defilement, in Purity and Danger Douglas ([1966] 2002: 21) observed two strategies 
used by prior anthropologists for interpreting these practices whilst retaining the 
assumption that holiness and impurity rightfully distinct. A first is to regard practices in which uncleanness has religious significance as mere Ǯmagical superstitionǯ; she cites 
Robertson Smith. The second strategy she mentions is the idea of the Ǯthe ambivalence of the sacredǯ. Yet she levels at Durkheim the criticism that his account leaves impure 
phenomena within the religious sphere, such as magic, rather neglected. However, more importantly, she argues that Durkheimǯs account renders the operation of pollution 
beliefs utterly invisible within secular discourses – including, for example, our own 
beliefs about hygiene. Interestingly, this was a problem which Levy-Bruhl had also 
started to recognise in his late notebooks, unpublished at the time Douglas was writing – though Douglas ([1968] 1975: 50) herself discerned trends in this direction already 
from his earlier writings. In his previous work Levy-Bruhlǯs argument had been that Ǯneither dirt nor contagion has for primitive men the same positive sense that they have for usǯ; by contrast, in his final writings he acknowledges that Ǯ) see more and more clearly that the distinction between the two sorts of experience cannot be maintainedǯ 
(1975: 186-8). Similarly observing the difficulties caused for anthropology by a 
categorical division between modern hygiene and religious pollution discourses, 
Douglas ([1966] 2002: 27) states that Ǯthese problems did not interest Durkheim. He 
followed Robertson Smithǯ in presuming that Ǯthe rules which he called hygienic are without their load of social symbolismǯ.  
Purity and Danger is thus both loyal and disloyal to Durkheim. On the one hand, Durkheimǯs elevation of Semitic and savage religion to the same level as Protestant 
Christianity is further expanded by Douglas, who includes secular discourses within the very same analytical lens as religious discourses, Ǯspiritualǯ or otherwise. All are 
considered in terms of the function of their classifications for achievement of social 
order. However, in doing so Douglas makes two important moves with respect to Durkheimǯs account of the sacred. The first is that she attends very pointedly to the 
relative neglect of the impure aspect of the sacred, correcting what she perceives as a 
lack of attention to this topic. Douglas gives an account of how societies can incorporate 
the unclean phenomenon within a narrative that venerates it as a symbol, such as using it to represent the role of Ǯevil and deathǯ within the Ǯgrand, unifying patternǯ of life 
([1966] 2002: 49-50). Douglasǯ biographer points out that this insistence on the 
capacity of the sacred for pure and impure aspects can be regarded as in part the heritage of her familiarity with and commitment to ǮRoman Catholic imageryǯ ȋFardon 
2002: 155).  
However, perhaps the more significant move is that Douglas identifies and 
analyses the role of purity and impurity in a domain from which Durkheimǯs theory 
excluded them: the profane. ǮRitual Uncleannessǯ, the next chapter of Purity and Danger, 
presents the theoretical discovery of ǮSecular Defilementǯ. Durkheim associated Ǯthe profaneǯ with labour ȋ[ͳͻͳʹ] ʹͲͲͳ: ʹʹͺȌ, women ȋ[ͳͻͳʹ] ʹͲͲͳ: ͳͲ͹, ʹʹ͹Ȍ, materiality 
and especially the materiality of the body ([1912] 2001: 325; [1914] 1973: 159), 
activities that are lower in Ǯprestigeǯ and Ǯdignityǯ ȋ[ͳͻͲ͸] ͳͻͷ͵: ʹͻ; [ͳͻͳʹ] ʹͲͲͳ: ͵͹Ȍ, 
and with activities conducted regularly by individuals rather than collectively on special 
days of the calendar ([1900a] 1992: 55; [1912] 2001: 229). Yet Douglas states that 
themes of purity and impurity were made salient precisely in a profane and secular 
domain with every one of these characteristics: the efforts of her housework, which she 
recognised as full of symbolically-laden classifications of purity and defilement. Douglas 
(1999a: 19) later stated that she regarded the use of Ǯsecular as well as religious examplesǯ of how pollution practices worked as a potentially Ǯliberatingǯ theoretical 
move with respect to contemporary anthropological understanding. 
She recounts that her husband had a low tolerance for dirt in the home whereas Ǯ) am personally rather tolerant of disorderǯ, making it a hot issue for conversation in 
the course of running their home ([1966] 2002: viii, 2). Yet it was not simply that the 
standards of Jim and Mary Douglas were higher and lower respectively, but part of the discussions in the Douglas home focused on different standards. For example ǮMary and 
Janet learnt from the nuns of the Sacred Heart that there were places where things like 
hairbrushes belonged, and they certainly should not be found anywhere elseǯ ȋFardon 
2002: 151). 
 
When we honestly reflect on our busy scrubbings and cleanings in this light 
we know that we are not mainly trying to avoid disease. We are separating, 
placing boundaries, making visible statements about the home that we are 
intending to create out of the material house ([1966] 2002: 85).  
 
The growth of Purity and Danger out of reflections on the Ǯbusy scrubbingsǯ of 
housework ([1966] 2002: 85) contribute to a strong antipathy on the part of Douglas to Durkheimǯs attempt to restrict purity and impurity to aspects of Ǯthe sacredǯ. Looking back, Douglas ȋ[ʹͲͲʹ] ʹͲͳ͵: ʹͻȌ reflects that Ǯthe main intention of Purity and Danger 
was to join up certain threads that should never have been broken. The cut that had 
separated us, moderns from primitives, had to be repaired. Another cut wrongly 
separated religious speculations in metaphysics and theology from the daily lives and practice of the worshipersǯ. Just before starting to write Purity and Danger she wrote: ǮSince the old approach to taboo via religion and the idea of the sacred has been beset 
with confusion, the new approach should be through the idea of defilement in a secular senseǯ ȋ[ͳͻ͸Ͷ] ʹͲͳ͵: ͳͶͲȌ. Douglas therefore calls the first chapter following her literature review ǮSecular Defilementǯ, to highlight the inadequacy of the notion of Ǯthe sacredǯ as an account for diversity of themes of purity and impurity in everyday social 
practices. The significance that Douglas ([1966] 2002: 85) finds in the discursive activity that we enact Ǯas we push the (oover around, wipe grease off kitchen surfaces or squirt bleach into the toiletǯ is a fundamental theoretical move. Considerations of 
purity and impurity after Douglas have often therefore begun with the topic of Ǯbusy scrubbingsǯ ȋe.g. Forde et al. ʹͲͳͳ: ͵ͺȌ, using housecleaning as an experience-near way 
into the topic rather than in awareness of the theoretical stakes within Durkheimian 
theory that led Douglas to highlight housekeeping as evidence of secular defilement.  
 
Matter out of place  
 
Douglasǯ change to Durkheimǯs theory cross-cut the dichotomy between the sacred and 
the profane, and any division between religious and secular discourses. Yet Douglas 
retained the Durkheimian assumption that cherished symbols express and affirm the 
structure of society in its totality. She proposed that phenomena which contravened 
such classifications would be designated by society as impure: 
 
Is this really the difference between ritual pollution and our ideas of dirt: are 
our ideas hygienic and theirs are symbolic? Not a bit of it: I am going to argue 
that our ideas of dirt also express symbolic systems and the difference 
between pollution behaviour in one part of the world and another is only a 
matter of detail...  the old definition of dirt as matter out of place [is] a very 
suggestive approach. It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and 
a contravention of that order. Dirt, then, is never a unique, isolated event. 
When there is dirt there is system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic 
ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting 
inappropriate elements... It is a relative idea. Shoes are not dirty in 
themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table... In short, our 
pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely 
to confuse or contradict cherished classifications (Douglas 1966: 48). 
 
As Fardon (1999: 84) has noted, Purity and Danger presents Ǯa potentially bewildering richness of both constructive and critical argumentsǯ. One of the reasons for this is that 
Douglas seems rather aware that the old definition of dirt as matter out of place, whilst 
suggestive, does not always hold and cannot be the final word on the topic. Commenting 
on her attempt to make this qualification in Purity and Danger, Douglas (1999: 11) later came to Ǯadmit it was often expressed ambiguouslyǯ. Anttonen (2004: 113), too, has 
observed that in some places in Purity and Danger there is there is a lack of conceptual precision regarding the relationship between the construct of Ǯpurityǯ and the ideas of Ǯthe sacredǯ or the Ǯholyǯ. 
 Douglas attributes the phrase Ǯdirt is matter out of placeǯ to Lord Chestertonǯs 
1852 remark at the Royal Agricultural Society that Ǯ) have heard it said that dirt is 
nothing but a thing in a wrong placeǯ; proximally, however, Douglasǯ reference comes from William Jamesǯ ȋͳͻͲͳ: ͳʹͻȌ The Varieties of Religious Experience who in fact used 
the phrase Ǯmatter out of placeǯ rather than Ǯin a wrong placeǯ, and who is quoted doing 
so on page 203 of Purity and Danger. The quote, however, cuts off with ellipses Jamesǯ 
insistence that this theory cannot be the whole story, and only applies under some 
circumstances. This would suggest that Douglas was aware, whether from James or 
from other sources, of the long-standing history of criticism of Chestertonǯs aphorism as 
a heuristic. To give but one example, in his Hellenism and Christianity (1921: 144), E.R. 
Bevan argued that the idea that dirt is ǮǲMatter in the wrong placeǳ plainlyǯ cannot be 
sufficient since Ǯif the field of the disagreeable and the noxious extends in one direction 
beyond that of the polluting, it is equally true that we regard a good deal as dirt, which 
we could not show to be particularly noxious or painful. The two fields overlap, but they do not coincide.ǯ Whether from James, some awareness of this longer tradition of 
criticism, or from her own reasoning, no more than a few pages after proffering Ǯdirt is 
matter out of placeǯ as a theory of purity and impurity, Douglas goes on to identify that there are Ǯvarious provisions for dealing with ambiguous or anomalous eventsǯ besides 
classifying them as impure ([1966] 2002: 39).  
One Ǯprovisionǯ mentioned by Douglas for dealing with anomalies and 
ambiguities without recourse to purity/impurity classifications is, simply, to reclassify 
the phenomenon to make it no longer ambiguous or anomalous. Another is to eliminate 
the phenomenon before any need to classify it as impure arises; where there are 
sufficient sanctions to eliminate the phenomenon or back in line, Douglas is adamant 
that purity and impurity discourses need not be employed, but will only appear when 
these sanctions require legitimating or bolstering (see Douglas 1980). Yet another case, 
mentioned elsewhere in the text, is that when matter has fully decomposed and lost 
even the ghost of identity, it no longer evokes a classification as impure ([1966] 2002: 
197). )n her article on ǮPollutionǯ, written shortly after Purity and Danger, Douglas 
([1968] 1975: 56-7) specifies the significance of culture and epistemology in varying 
how and where purity and impurity classifications occur: Ǯour culture trains us to 
believe that anomalies are only due to a temporary inadequate formulation of general natural lawsǯ but that Ǯother ways of dividing up and evaluating reality are conceivableǯ, and will impact upon how we perceive Ǯanything which seems to defy the apparently implicit categories of the universeǯ. For instance, Douglas ([1968] 1975: 58) specifies 
that there is no necessary association between impurity and either disgust or horror – 
as later readers of Douglas and considerations of impurity have widely presumed, such 
as Kristeva. Such limitations on Douglasǯ proposal that Ǯdirt is matter out of placeǯ were 
elaborated in Natural Symbols (1970), in the consideration of contexts in which order is 
more or less at stake. Yet despite the limitations already acknowledged in Purity and 
Danger, Douglas states in ending the chapter on ǮSecular Defilementǯ that the value of 
the Ǯmatter out of placeǯ paradigm is that it represents a step beyond prior theory, which 
had excluded purity and impurity from profane and secular discourses: Ǯto recognise 
this is the first step towards insight into pollution. It involves us in no clear-cut distinction between sacred and secular. The same principle applies throughoutǯ ȋ[ͳͻ͸͸] 
2002: 50).  
To clinch her argument against Robertson Smith and his influence on Durkheim, 
it was then logical for Douglas in the subsequent chapter to use her account to show the 
logic of the very Semitic ritual laws which Robertson Smith had denigrated as 
aberrations of thought: ǮWhen Robertson Smith applied the ideas of primitive, irrational 
and unexplainable to some parts of the Hebrew religion they remained thus labelled and unexamined to this dayǯ ȋ[ͳͻ͸͸] ʹͲͲʹ: ͷ͹Ȍ. This chapter was first delivered as a set of Lunch (our Lectures at UCL in ͳͻͷͻ, and was Ǯfilled with notes taken from Franz Steinerǯs Tabooǯ ȋFardon 2002: 154), in which the influence of Robertson Smith is the 
antagonist and, indeed, characterised as himself a bar to progress in anthropological 
theory. Douglasǯ demonstration of the greater acuity of her account precisely on Robertson Smithǯs terrain of Semitic religion resulted in the game-changing application of her paradigm to Ǯthe Abominations of Leviticusǯ. Rather than conceptualising the 
prohibition on pork as the result of a confused relationship with the sacred (as in 
Robertson Smith, and in Durkheim), Douglas notes that this prohibition obeys a logic in 
that pigs breach the classificatory system of the text for species of animals. This work Ǯlaid the theoretical foundation for all subsequent work on ritual impurity in the 
Hebrew Bible. Indeed, virtually every academically oriented treatment of impurity in ancient )srael since ͳͻ͸͸ has built on Douglasǯs work in some wayǯ ȋKlawans ʹͲͲͲ: 8). )t is also possible to view Douglasǯ renewed attention to Leviticus in Leviticus as 
Literature (1999b) as partly a return to her polemic with Robertson Smith. Introducing the book, she cites Roberson Smithǯs ȋͳͺͻͶ: xlvȌ statement that Biblical studies had reached Ǯa point where nothing of vital importance for the historical study of the Old 
Testament religion remains uncertainǯ. She criticises Smith, since his view cannot explain why Ǯa people make a clean sweep of their old religion and adopt overnight a 
radical, puritanical, egalitarian basisǯ ȋͳͻͻͻb: 6). She diagnoses in Robertson Smith a 
religious desire to Ǯreach backǯ to the origin in order to find the true meaning (1999b: 
8), and reprises her criticism of his view that discourses of impure sacredness in the 
Hebrew Bible reveal the moral backwardness of the Hebrews compared to the 
Protestant knowledge that the sacred is pure. Against Robertson Smith, she insists that Ǯthere is no justification for the moral evolutionismǯ at the basis of his account ȋͳͻͻͻb: 
8). She emphasises that Ǯthe Abomination of Leviticusǯ are not regarded as bad; the 
prohibition of their slaughter for food was a particular way of offering them protection, 
as different but equal with other creatures in creation: Ǯimpure was not originally a term of vilificationǯ (1999: 145). Purity/impurity, she argues, should be distinguished both 
from the axis sacred/profane and from the axis good/bad.  
 
Conclusion 
 ǲEach dominant theory blocks out other kinds of questionsǯ Douglas, ǮAn Aesthetic Viewǯ ȋ[ʹͲͲͺ] ʹͲͳ͵: ͳ͹͹Ȍ 
 Attention to the Ǯopening questionǯ of Purity and Danger offers a new perspective on the 
text, as a response to the state of a debate between Robertson Smith and Durkheim 
regarding the theoretical status of impurity – within and outside the sacred realm. Durkheim had reconfigured Robertson Smithǯs account, treating purity and impurity as 
dimensions of a universal quality of religious life specifically and of societies generally: 
the sacred. Douglas accepts Durkheimǯs conclusion, that cherished symbols express and 
affirm the structure of society as a totality. However, she disagreed that purity and 
impurity could be reduced to aspects of the sacred, and she highlighted their 
significance as symbols within housework, as a decidedly profane domain of life. In 
doing so, Douglas opened up purity and impurity as a field of theoretical inquiry in their 
specificity.  Douglas ȋ[ͳͻ͸͸] ʹͲͲʹ: ͶͶȌ proposes that Ǯoutdoor things indoors; upstairs things downstairs; underclothing appearing where overclothing should be… our pollution 
behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished classificationsǯ. This idea, captured in the phrase that Ǯdirt is matter out of placeǯ, was not proffered as the totalising or definitive theory it has been 
understood to be by those reading the claims of Purity and Danger outside their 
theoretical context. Douglas fully and explicitly recognised the inadequacy of this as a 
general account within pages of citing the phrase. Instead, the idea that impurity would 
attend transgressions of cherished boundaries was deployed as an attempt to slice open 
the Durkheimian division between sacred and profane, to open the possibility for new 
theory attending to purity and impurity in their specificity. In part because the stakes of Douglasǯ argument have been missed, this possibility has not been explored to the 
extent that it can or should be. Since the conventional place to put discussions of purity and impurity, under the rubric of Ǯthe sacredǯ, risks flattening these themes, there has 
not been the robust containing framework which generally facilitates cumulative 
theoretical attention to a topic (see Zysman 2012). As Douglas (1999: 12) herself observed in dismay, ǮRobertson Smith still reigns in most scholarly worksǯ, and Campkin 
(2007: 79) concluded in his review of work on purity and impurity since Douglasǯ Purity 
and Danger, Ǯthe topic as a whole has been under theorized since the bookǯs publicationǯ. 
This observation matches that Kristeva (2004: 155), whose elaborations on and debates 
with Douglas I have considered elsewhere, who notes that her Ǯinvestigation into abjection... picks up on a certain vacuumǯ (Duschinsky 2013a).  
Surveying the contemporary field, Graham (2007) and Osbaldiston and Petray 
(2011) have argued that subsuming purity and impurity as merely aspects of Ǯthe sacredǯ has been to the detriment of both the development of anthropological theory 
and to the empirical analysis of defiling or polluted phenomena. Sustained attention to 
purity and impurity in their specificity, which a reading of Douglasǯ work in context 
facilitates, manifestly and significantly reveals that it is only some mixtures or 
transgressions of cherished boundaries which have the effect of eliciting 
purity/impurity codings. When Ǯupstairs things [are] downstairsǯ, to take one of 
Douglasǯ illustrations, matter is indeed out of place – but impurity is not generally 
mobilised as the appropriate discursive framing. Such attention to the logic of purity 
and impurity within particular discourses helps hold open a potentially fruitful research 
agenda for anthropological theory, addressing cultural and historical variation both in 
notions of purity/impurity and in the kinds of classifications which elicit them. Beyond any synchronic analysis, Douglasǯ analysis presents us with the question of when, 
actually, is dirt matter out of place? Or again, phrased differently, what must we assume 
about place, precisely, for this phrase to hold true?  
ǮDirt is matter out of placeǯ undoubtedly identifies an important regularity. 
Elsewhere colleagues and I have worked to respond to Douglasǯs call for work to refine 
this theory. Our method has been to interrogate secular themes of Ǯpurityǯ in greater 
depth. In this, we have worked in the space carved out by Purity and Danger for 
sustained analysis of purity/impurity, but departing markedly from the common 
strategy of subsequent theorists, who have tended to focus primary attention on 
impurity, and treat purity as merely the absence of impurity (e.g. Kristeva [1980] 1982; 
Moore 2000). We have also worked to examine the specific content given to the idea of 
purity in hegemonic Western and global discourses on nationalism, femininity and 
childhood (Duschinsky & Lampitt 2012; Duschinsky 2013b;). We suggest that Ǯdirt is matter out of placeǯ in such discourses when Ǯplaceǯ is conceptualised as qualitatively 
homogenous and corresponding to some pre-existing truth or essence. We have 
explored the history of such ideas in early and middle Platonism, in Christainity, and in 
later Western thought (Duschinsky & Robson 2013). Yet, like Douglas, we have also 
worked to explore purity in cross-cultural perspective. Whereas Douglas places 
emphasis on classificatory systems, we have explored the materiality of the image of 
purity as the reason for the family resemblances which can be discerned in its use 
between cultures. This approach was already implied in Douglasǯs language and 
metaphors, if not the dominant thread of her argument. For instance, we have examined 
the association between purity and whiteness, facilitated but not determined by the fact 
that Ǯthe uniformity of whiteness can be used to signify qualitative homogeneity, its 
emptiness can be mobilised to signify a transparent correspondence between 
phenomena or forms of subjectivity and their originary state, and the immediate 
visibility of any mark suggests a fragile vulnerability which makes any deviation already 
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